Guerrillas Merger into Army? : Unfortunate!

Krishna Hari Pushkar

Berlin, Germany

In Nepal, there is ongoing blackjack discussion about the Integration of Maoist Rebellion Guerrillas into Nepal Army and most probably it will be amalgamated, this situation emerged due to State is under the control of Insurgents. I have personally criticised the model and way of peace accord since beginning because of its poor feasibility, now its hindering to go forward on agreed peace road map. State is compelled to make one after other frequent amendments as per Maoist will and strategy. I would say, State lost dignity in the case. However, I am not against the peace process, my concern is only technical part of peace process that drastically failed and now state anguishes with severe crisis.

The Nepalese peace accord, UN strategy over Nepal and role of international communities has been by now proved substandard. The prime minister of Nepal has repeatedly realised the ongoing Insurgents Supremacy Over State, it is a solid consequences of his & his teamsters blunder. Although, the existing cabinet, un-legitimated interim parliament, irresponsible political parties, UN and also International communitys ill strategies are being positive to go for another suicidal action that is Merger of Maoist Guerrilla into Nepal Army. If such decision is taken blindly, it would prove a milestone towards the invitation of another military revolt. Its my research based presumption that such step goes in straight direction of another armed civil war. It could register as a most historical black step as Crime Against Nepal and Nepalese.

Why Maoist Guerrilla should not merge into Nepal Army?

1. The existing Maoist guerrillas neither meet any professional standard and norms of State Military nor possible after merger due to some professional decisive factor is that practised and legitimated in International arena under the concept and motto of State Army.

2. Maoist Guerrillas are political arm extremist, biased, infected with farthest Maoism and responsible towards specific political ideology and its party.

3. There might be similar questions emerged in the cases of another existing insurgent groups. There are more than two dozens of another arm rebellions group who have been also fighting against State in various part of Nepal. The nature and composition of other insurgents groups are also similar like Maoist guerrillas or would say majorities are the splinter groups of Maoist.

4. The existing performances and activities of Maoist guerrillas are still rebellious; they are neither even trying to tend to normality nor believing in peaceful political democratic philosophy even after entering in the peace process under the supervision of UN.

How to solve the Problem?

However, State and international communities have the responsibility to manage the issues in effective and efficient way but of course it is a matter of serious discussion to identify the appropriate model to resolve the crisis and integrate the Maoist guerrillas into State organs. As it is a prime responsibility of a State to provide enough employment opportunity, mobilise and use of their available human resources as per their quality and expertise. By considering the point, State could arrange all possible approaches and means without affecting the national security structures as per international national defence structural practices.

Besides, I salute and well aware about some specific political qualities, influential public diplomacy, geo-social grass-root level idea-knowledge-command and other developmental commitment and efficiencies of Maoist guerrilla. Therefore, the integration of Maoist Insurgents into State organs could be also possible through the following model:

Model one: To establish an independent infrastructure development brigade/company model under any suitable organs of State and recruit them by developing some specific ad-hoc norms. It is believed that the existing Maoist guerrilla have better ideas and knowledge about how to do manage better infrastructural development in remote mountainous part of Nepal. It could be possible to use them for developmental perspective of road, irrigation, hydropower, buildings, electricity, transportation and other forms of developmental activities.

Model two: To establish independent security battalions to provide special private security to the industrial companies, private entrepreneurs, events, and other who seeks paid security service from State.

In my conclusion, I must mention that State should not be forced or compelled to take any decision that would become a cause and reason of another civil war in Nepal.

I was fully aware about the ongoing consequences that agreed model can not be applied effectively and efficiently into practice. Finally, my remarks became true as it was rationale and based on factual researches and studies. However, my arguments were ignored and not responded with needy any assessment.

(Author is a Peace and Conflict Management professional and hold special expertise about Nepalese Issues)